# Audit Findings Retrospective

## Analysis of Your Findings

### Finding Overview
1. H-01: Blocked User Can Call `SoulboundProfileNFT::mintProfile` Again
   - Originally marked as High severity
   - Actually Medium severity
   - Valid finding but severity overestimated

2. H-02: User Fund Sent to LikeRegistry::likeUser is Never Accounted
   - High severity
   - Valid finding
   - Well documented with proper severity assessment

## Areas for Improvement

1. **Severity Assessment**
   - H-01 was overestimated as High when it should be Medium
   - Consider the following for severity assessment:
     - Immediate financial impact
     - Likelihood of exploitation
     - Complexity of the attack
     - Required preconditions

2. **Impact Analysis**
   - Could expand more on the real-world implications
   - Consider including specific attack scenarios
   - Quantify potential losses where possible

3. **Alternative Attack Vectors**
   - Could explore more variations of the attacks
   - Consider combining vulnerabilities for compound effects
   - Analyze potential bypass methods for proposed fixes

## Recommendations for Future Findings

1. **Severity Classification**
   - Use CVSS scoring system or similar framework
   - Document severity reasoning more explicitly
   - Consider both impact and likelihood

2. **Documentation Enhancement**
   - Include diagrams for complex attack flows
   - Add more real-world exploitation scenarios
   - Document any assumptions made

3. **Testing Methodology**
   - Include more edge cases in POCs
   - Test fixes against multiple attack vectors
   - Document test coverage

## Learning from Other Auditors' Findings

### 1. Deeper State Analysis (from M-01)
- Other auditors identified the same issue with blocked profiles but approached it differently
- They focused on the root cause (state management) rather than just the symptom
- Key learning: Always analyze how state changes affect the entire system lifecycle
- Their solution with `isBlocked` mapping is more robust and gas-efficient

### 2. Complex Scenario Modeling (from M-02)
- Impressive multi-step attack scenario involving multiple users
- Demonstrated deep understanding of business logic flaws
- Key learnings:
  - Consider how different user interactions can be combined
  - Test complex user interaction sequences
  - Think about how state resets affect future interactions
  - Pay attention to accounting mechanisms and balance tracking

### 3. Quality of Documentation
- Other auditors excelled in:
  - Clear step-by-step attack scenarios
  - Detailed proof of concepts with multiple actors
  - Well-structured test cases that prove the vulnerability
  - Thorough explanation of the root cause

### 4. Advanced Testing Techniques
- Use of descriptive console.log statements in POCs
- Creation of multiple test accounts with meaningful names
- Systematic approach to testing complex scenarios
- Clear separation of setup, execution, and verification in tests

### 5. Recommendations Quality
- Solutions consider:
  - Gas efficiency
  - State management
  - Future extensibility
  - Clear upgrade paths

### 6. Centralization Risk Analysis (from M-03)
- Identified important centralization risks in permissioned functions
- Considered user fund safety in relation to admin powers
- Key learnings:
  - Always analyze privileged functions for potential abuse
  - Consider user fund safety in relation to admin actions
  - Propose decentralized alternatives (e.g., voting mechanisms)
  - Think about user protection mechanisms

### 7. Smart Contract Security Patterns (from M-04)
- Excellent identification of CEI (Checks-Effects-Interactions) pattern violation
- Thorough understanding of reentrancy vectors in NFT minting
- Key learnings:
  - Always follow established security patterns
  - Consider callback functions as potential attack vectors
  - Pay attention to state updates ordering
  - Think about contract-to-contract interactions

### 8. Testing Innovation
From M-03 and M-04:
- Creation of specialized malicious contracts for testing
- Use of vm.prank and vm.startPrank effectively
- Clear test naming that describes the attack scenario
- Effective use of assertions to prove vulnerability impact

## Additional Key Takeaways

6. **Consider Centralization**: Always analyze privileged functions for potential abuse and propose decentralized alternatives
7. **Follow Security Patterns**: Adhere to established patterns like CEI and document any necessary deviations
8. **Test Edge Cases**: Create specialized contracts and scenarios to test security assumptions

## Conclusion

Remember to:
- Double-check severity ratings against standard frameworks
- Expand impact analysis with real-world scenarios
- Consider more complex attack vectors
- Test fixes thoroughly
- Document assumptions and limitations