128 lines
4.7 KiB
Markdown
128 lines
4.7 KiB
Markdown
# Audit Findings Retrospective
|
|
|
|
## Analysis of Your Findings
|
|
|
|
### Finding Overview
|
|
1. H-01: Blocked User Can Call `SoulboundProfileNFT::mintProfile` Again
|
|
- Originally marked as High severity
|
|
- Actually Medium severity
|
|
- Valid finding but severity overestimated
|
|
|
|
2. H-02: User Fund Sent to LikeRegistry::likeUser is Never Accounted
|
|
- High severity
|
|
- Valid finding
|
|
- Well documented with proper severity assessment
|
|
|
|
## Areas for Improvement
|
|
|
|
1. **Severity Assessment**
|
|
- H-01 was overestimated as High when it should be Medium
|
|
- Consider the following for severity assessment:
|
|
- Immediate financial impact
|
|
- Likelihood of exploitation
|
|
- Complexity of the attack
|
|
- Required preconditions
|
|
|
|
2. **Impact Analysis**
|
|
- Could expand more on the real-world implications
|
|
- Consider including specific attack scenarios
|
|
- Quantify potential losses where possible
|
|
|
|
3. **Alternative Attack Vectors**
|
|
- Could explore more variations of the attacks
|
|
- Consider combining vulnerabilities for compound effects
|
|
- Analyze potential bypass methods for proposed fixes
|
|
|
|
## Recommendations for Future Findings
|
|
|
|
1. **Severity Classification**
|
|
- Use CVSS scoring system or similar framework
|
|
- Document severity reasoning more explicitly
|
|
- Consider both impact and likelihood
|
|
|
|
2. **Documentation Enhancement**
|
|
- Include diagrams for complex attack flows
|
|
- Add more real-world exploitation scenarios
|
|
- Document any assumptions made
|
|
|
|
3. **Testing Methodology**
|
|
- Include more edge cases in POCs
|
|
- Test fixes against multiple attack vectors
|
|
- Document test coverage
|
|
|
|
## Learning from Other Auditors' Findings
|
|
|
|
### 1. Deeper State Analysis (from M-01)
|
|
- Other auditors identified the same issue with blocked profiles but approached it differently
|
|
- They focused on the root cause (state management) rather than just the symptom
|
|
- Key learning: Always analyze how state changes affect the entire system lifecycle
|
|
- Their solution with `isBlocked` mapping is more robust and gas-efficient
|
|
|
|
### 2. Complex Scenario Modeling (from M-02)
|
|
- Impressive multi-step attack scenario involving multiple users
|
|
- Demonstrated deep understanding of business logic flaws
|
|
- Key learnings:
|
|
- Consider how different user interactions can be combined
|
|
- Test complex user interaction sequences
|
|
- Think about how state resets affect future interactions
|
|
- Pay attention to accounting mechanisms and balance tracking
|
|
|
|
### 3. Quality of Documentation
|
|
- Other auditors excelled in:
|
|
- Clear step-by-step attack scenarios
|
|
- Detailed proof of concepts with multiple actors
|
|
- Well-structured test cases that prove the vulnerability
|
|
- Thorough explanation of the root cause
|
|
|
|
### 4. Advanced Testing Techniques
|
|
- Use of descriptive console.log statements in POCs
|
|
- Creation of multiple test accounts with meaningful names
|
|
- Systematic approach to testing complex scenarios
|
|
- Clear separation of setup, execution, and verification in tests
|
|
|
|
### 5. Recommendations Quality
|
|
- Solutions consider:
|
|
- Gas efficiency
|
|
- State management
|
|
- Future extensibility
|
|
- Clear upgrade paths
|
|
|
|
### 6. Centralization Risk Analysis (from M-03)
|
|
- Identified important centralization risks in permissioned functions
|
|
- Considered user fund safety in relation to admin powers
|
|
- Key learnings:
|
|
- Always analyze privileged functions for potential abuse
|
|
- Consider user fund safety in relation to admin actions
|
|
- Propose decentralized alternatives (e.g., voting mechanisms)
|
|
- Think about user protection mechanisms
|
|
|
|
### 7. Smart Contract Security Patterns (from M-04)
|
|
- Excellent identification of CEI (Checks-Effects-Interactions) pattern violation
|
|
- Thorough understanding of reentrancy vectors in NFT minting
|
|
- Key learnings:
|
|
- Always follow established security patterns
|
|
- Consider callback functions as potential attack vectors
|
|
- Pay attention to state updates ordering
|
|
- Think about contract-to-contract interactions
|
|
|
|
### 8. Testing Innovation
|
|
From M-03 and M-04:
|
|
- Creation of specialized malicious contracts for testing
|
|
- Use of vm.prank and vm.startPrank effectively
|
|
- Clear test naming that describes the attack scenario
|
|
- Effective use of assertions to prove vulnerability impact
|
|
|
|
## Additional Key Takeaways
|
|
|
|
6. **Consider Centralization**: Always analyze privileged functions for potential abuse and propose decentralized alternatives
|
|
7. **Follow Security Patterns**: Adhere to established patterns like CEI and document any necessary deviations
|
|
8. **Test Edge Cases**: Create specialized contracts and scenarios to test security assumptions
|
|
|
|
## Conclusion
|
|
|
|
Remember to:
|
|
- Double-check severity ratings against standard frameworks
|
|
- Expand impact analysis with real-world scenarios
|
|
- Consider more complex attack vectors
|
|
- Test fixes thoroughly
|
|
- Document assumptions and limitations |